

The President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee

R&D Exchange Physical Breakout Session

Mr. David Barron, BellSouth Mr. Jim Craft, Raytheon

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Physical: Current State of Trustworthiness

The current state of trustworthiness related to the physical security of telecommunications assets is characterized by:

- No defined or government validated threats or adversary attack plan against which to protect facilities
- Inability to protect against all feasible attack techniques
- Difficulty in determining what threats exist with regard to the telecommunications industry
- Lack of widespread understanding and appreciation of the sophistication of threats
- Lack of procedures for protecting companies' human capital during times of attack (need to focus on people not just physical assets)





Members of the physical breakout session defined the following top priorities for further investigation through industry/government partnership(s):

- Undertake simulation for NS/EP events and modeling that includes virtual attack/defense of facilities/networks
- Develop better vulnerability analysis to understand critical single points of failure and interdependencies
- Develop industry standards for and implement a national standard industrial I.D. card that is biometrics based
- Investigate standards for the diversity of critical infrastructure
- · Develop a system for the automatic defense of cable routes from "backhoes", etc
- Provide better background checks for people with access to critical facilities
- Develop a process to analyze patterns of facility use (looking for social engineering, data mining, etc)
- Withdraw critical vulnerability information from the public domain



Physical: Technology To Improve Trustworthiness

- "Sim Facility" Simulation (like SimCity Game)
- Modeling that includes virtual attack/defense of facilities/networks
- Modeling of cascading, cross sector and widespread/catastrophic outages
- Biometrics
- Immune building technology to deal with biohazards



Physical: Impediments to Future R&D on Trustworthiness

- Financial constraints
 - Companies/Governments do not have the financial/human resources to protect against every possibility
 - Regulatory and other pressures may limit some security investments
- Competitive nature of the telecommunications industry
- Information sharing
 - Making information available to the parties that need it without increasing vulnerabilities
 - Government does not explain its need and projected use of highly sensitive industry data
 - Industry and Government do not demonstrate mutual trust



An Agenda for Action should:

- Define levels of "critical" and determine what telecommunications assets can be considered critical for NS/EP purposes and interdependencies
- Determine what threats exist with regard to the telecommunications industry and develop a rapid method for disseminating this information to those in industry who need it
- Develop modeling and simulations technology related to protection of those assets deemed critical